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INTRODUCTION
On April 20, 1999, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold went on a killing
spree at Columbine High School.1  Although police officers, sheriff’s
deputies, and SWAT-team members quickly arrived at the scene of the
shooting, none of them entered the building for twenty minutes.2  A 911
dispatcher instructed students to remain in the library instead of evacuat-
ing through an exterior entrance.3  Then, although the dispatcher could
hear through the open line the shooters entering the library and commit-
ting one murder after another, a dozen officers stationed near the exit
made no effort to enter the building, walk fifteen steps, and confront the
murderers.4  The two shooters—the only armed individuals in the build-
ing—managed to kill ten students while the police stood idle.5
By 12:30 P.M., the police learned that the shooters had committed
suicide.6  By this time, at least two people had called 911 and informed
police of the exact location where a science teacher, David Sanders, lay
seriously wounded.7  A student placed a sign in the window, stating,
“One bleeding to death.”8  At 1:10 P.M., the first SWAT team entered
the building, but the command post never told them about Sanders’ loca-
tion and condition—despite the post continuing to reassure those accom-
panying Sanders that help was on the way.9  SWAT officers did not
reach Sanders until 2:42 P.M. and a paramedic did not arrive for another
forty-two minutes.10  By that time, Sanders—the last wounded person
reached by police despite being the only one known to require emer-
gency medical treatment—had finally bled to death.11
This sort of tragedy caused by inaction by public officials is not an
isolated incident.  In the wake of the fatal shooting of an unarmed civil-
1 David Kohn, What Really Happened at Columbine?, CBS NEWS (Apr. 17, 2001),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/what-really-happened-at-columbine/.
2 David Kopel, The Police Stood Idle, DAVEKOPEL.ORG (Apr. 20, 2000), http://www
.davekopel.org/2A/OpEds/THE-POLICE-STOOD-IDLE.htm.
3 Schnurr v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1117 (D. Colo. 2001).
4 Kopel, supra note 2. R
5 Id.
6 Sanders v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1102 (D. Colo. 2001).
7 Id.
8 Kohn, supra note 1. R
9 See id.; Sanders, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 1103.
10 Kohn, supra note 1. R
11 Sanders, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 1103.
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ian in Ferguson, Mississippi, much critical attention has been focused on
overly aggressive police behavior causing tragedies.12 However, there
are still many examples of public officials not doing enough to prevent
such tragedies.13  Even though protecting the public is supposed to be the
police’s reason to exist, the current legal framework does not properly
incentivize officers to do more to save lives because they are protected
from liability for negligence by what is known as the public duty doc-
trine.14  Under the public duty doctrine, a state and its officials have no
duty to provide public services to particular citizens unless those citizens
can claim a “special relationship” with the state—a requirement that citi-
zens can only meet if they prove both “(1) a direct or continuing contact
between the injured party and a governmental agency or official, and (2)
a justifiable reliance on the part of the injured party.”15
This Note will argue that in states that employ the public duty doc-
trine, courts should automatically presume that a special relationship ex-
ists to protect citizens from violent criminal acts in gun-free zones such
as schools, or else legislatures should statutorily impose on officers an
affirmative duty to aid in areas where the legislature has prohibited fire-
arms.  It will focus on negligence committed by state and local officers—
not federal employees whose common law torts can be remedied only by
bringing a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act.16  Part I will discuss
the background of the public duty doctrine and its interaction with immu-
nity doctrines.  Part II will argue that courts should presume that a spe-
cial relationship exists when officers initiate a rescue in a gun-free zone
such as a school.  Part III will argue that legislatures should enact legisla-
tion that imposes on officers an affirmative duty to aid in such zones and
that waives any sovereign immunity to such claims that the state may
currently enjoy.
12 See, e.g., Conor Friedersdorf, The Killing of Kajieme Powell and How It Divides
Americans, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 21, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/
08/the-killing-of-kajieme-powell/378899/ (summarizing critical reactions to footage of officers
shooting mentally disturbed civilian); Rand Paul, We Must Demilitarize the Police, TIME (Aug.
14, 2014), http://time.com/3111474/rand-paul-ferguson-police/ (arguing that “there should be
a difference between a police response and a military response”).
13 See, e.g., Allison Gas Turbine Div. of General Motors Corp. v. District of Columbia,
642 A.2d 841, 842 (D.C. 1994) (harbor patrol officers refused help from private citizens with
scuba gear, allowing passengers of downed helicopter to drown before harbor patrol divers
arrived); Rennix v. Jackson, 990 N.Y.S.2d 439 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014) (emergency medical
technician (EMT) worker on lunch break failed to assist victim who died of asthma attack).
14 See Allen v. District of Columbia, 100 A.3d 63, 78 (D.C. 2014) (using doctrine to bar
allegations that EMTs negligently failed to properly evaluate victim’s condition).
15 Allen, 100 A.3d at 70 (citing Klahr v. District of Columbia, 576 A.2d 718, 720 (D.C.
1990)).
16 See Cassandra Cole, A Review of State Sovereign Immunity Statutes and the Manage-
ment of Liability Risks by States, 32 J. INS. REG. 45 (2013).
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I. HOW THE PUBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE WORKS
A. History and Operation of the Doctrine in Common Law Cases
Traditional tort principles impose a duty on individuals to exercise
reasonable care when they initiate a rescue of another.17  Of course, res-
cuing civilians is part of the job description for many state agents such as
police, firefighters, and EMTs.18  But some courts have expressed con-
cern that allowing injured parties to sue for negligence when officials fail
to protect them would require courts and juries to second-guess the ade-
quacy of public officials’ performance in office.19 Furthermore, these
courts are concerned with imposing overwhelming liability on govern-
ment agencies with limited resources.20  Therefore, to ensure that public
officials do not assume greater duties by virtue of becoming officials,
state courts have recognized, separate from sovereign immunity, a pro-
tection for state and local governments from tort liability when agents
negligently perform acts within the scope of their public duties.21  This
protection attaches at the duty stage of tort analysis and bars injured ci-
vilians from recovering damages.22  This protection is known as the pub-
lic duty doctrine, and is recognized as a defense to tort claims in many
states.23
For example, in 1981, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
launched the development of the public duty doctrine in the District of
Columbia in the case of Warren v. District of Columbia.24  In Warren,
three women accused the Metropolitan Police Department of negligently
17 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
18 See What Police and Detectives Do, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls
.gov/ooh/Protective-Service/Police-and-detectives.htm#tab-2 (last visited Nov. 16, 2014);
What Firefighters Do, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/ooh/protective-ser-
vice/firefighters.htm#tab-2 (last visited Nov. 16, 2014); What EMTs and Paramedics Do, BU-
REAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/ooh/healthcare/emts-and-paramedics
.htm#tab-2 (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
19 E.g., Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1, 8 (D.C. 1981).
20 E.g., Braswell v. Braswell, 410 S.E.2d 897, 901 (N.C. 1991); Riss v. New York, 240
N.E.2d 860, 860–61 (N.Y. 1968).
21 See Allen v. District of Columbia, 100 A.3d 63, 78 (D.C. 2014) (Easterly, J., dissent-
ing) (explaining how the court in Warren applied a public duty analysis separate from sover-
eign immunity); Warren, 444 A.2d at 8 (explaining how officers do not assume a greater duty
to others).
22 See Allen, 100 A.3d at 78 (Easterly, J., dissenting) (summarizing the history of the
public duty doctrine in the District of Columbia).
23 See, e.g., Stevenson v. City of Doraville, 726 S.E.2d 726, 728–29 (Ga. 2012) (using
public duty doctrine to bar claim against officer for failing to redirect traffic from victim’s
disabled vehicle); Wood v. Guilford County, 558 S.E.2d 490, 494–97 (N.C. 2002) (using pub-
lic duty doctrine to bar claim against county for failing to provide security at courthouse ade-
quate to prevent assault); White v. Beasley, 552 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Mich. 1996) (holding that the
public duty doctrine applies in Michigan to insulate officers from tort liability for failure to
provide police protection).
24 Allen, 100 A.3d at 78 (Easterly, J., dissenting).
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failing to protect them from intruders in their home.25  When two of the
women heard the screams of the third on the floor below, they called the
police to report a burglary in progress.26  The police arrived and knocked
on the front door, but left when they received no answer, and did so
without checking the back entrance.27  The women again called the po-
lice and were told that help was on the way, but the call was never dis-
patched to any officers.28  Believing the police may be in the house, the
two women called out to the third, alerting the two intruders to their
presence.29  As a result, the three victims were held captive for fourteen
hours, raped, robbed, and beaten.30  The court held that the public duty
doctrine shielded the District from liability, stating that:
[W]hen a municipality or other governmental entity un-
dertakes to furnish police services, it assumes a duty
only to the public at large and not to individual members
of the community. Dereliction in the performance of po-
lice duties may, therefore, be redressed only in the con-
text of a public prosecution and not in a private suit for
money damages.31
Therefore, the D.C. court adopted the rule that both police officers and
the government entities employing them “are not generally liable to vic-
tims of criminal acts for failure to provide adequate police protection.”32
However, courts also recognize an exception to the public duty doc-
trine when the government has a “special relationship” with the plain-
tiff.33  Indeed, traditional tort principles acknowledge that an individual
has a duty to protect someone when they have a “special relation” with
that person.34  If a plaintiff proves that a special relationship exists, then
a court will hold that the government’s general duty transforms into a
specific duty to use reasonable care to protect the individual plaintiff,
reopening the government to liability.35
25 Warren, 444 A.2d at 2.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 4–5 (internal citations omitted).
32 See id. at 4.
33 See id. at 5–6 (citing other state courts holding that a general duty may become a
specific duty when a special relationship exists).
34 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
35 See Schuster v. New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 80–81 (N.Y. 1958) (holding that government
owed special duty to protect informant).
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Although different states vary as to the elements necessary to prove
that a special relationship exists,36 a plaintiff must usually prove that
there was “direct contact or continuing contact with the government
agency or official” and that the plaintiff exercised “justifiable reliance.”37
To show a direct or continuing contact, a plaintiff must do more than
simply emerge to the special attention of the government; the type of
contact must be different than that with the general public.38  To show
justifiable reliance, a “plaintiff must specifically act, or refrain from act-
ing, in such a way as to exhibit particular reliance upon the actions of the
police.”39  This is a high standard to meet,40 and indeed, the court in
Warren held that the plaintiffs—despite their individual calls for help—
failed to establish a special relationship and therefore could not recover
damages.41  However, if a plaintiff does establish a special relationship,
then the government may be liable for standard negligence claims.
B. Comparison to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims
Often, instead of bringing common law tort claims, plaintiffs will
sue law enforcement for their failure to protect as a deprivation of life or
liberty without due process of law, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.42  Presuma-
bly, plaintiffs bring these claims instead because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 al-
36 See Licia A. Esposito Eaton, Annotation, Liability of Municipality or Other Govern-
mental Unit for Failure to Provide Police Protection from Crime, 90 A.L.R.5th 273 § 2[b]
(2001). Compare Cuffy v. New York, 505 N.E.2d 937, 940 (N.Y. 1987) (internal citations
omitted) (“The elements of this ‘special relationship’ are: (1) an assumption by the municipal-
ity, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was
injured; (2) knowledge on the part of the municipality’s agents that inaction could lead to
harm; (3) some form of direct contact between the municipality’s agents and the injured party;
and (4) that party’s justifiable reliance on the municipality’s affirmative undertaking.”), with
Doe v. Calumet City, 641 N.E.2d 498, 504 (Ill. 1994) (“(1) The municipality must be uniquely
aware of the particular danger or risk to which plaintiff is exposed; (2) there must be specific
acts or omissions on the part of the municipality; (3) the specific acts must be affirmative or
willful in nature; and (4) the injury must occur while the plaintiff is under the direct and
immediate control of municipal employees or agents.”).
37 See, e.g., Platt v. District of Columbia, 467 A.2d 149, 151 (D.C. 1983).
38 Compare Hines v. District of Columbia, 580 A.2d 133, 136 (D.C. 1990) (holding that
911 calls do not help establish special relationship), with Powell v. District of Columbia, 602
A.2d 1123, 1130–31 (D.C. 1992) (holding that personal transaction in which government un-
dertook to issue correct license plates and registration was a direct contact).
39 Morgan v. District of Columbia, 468 A.2d 1306, 1315 (D.C. 1983) (internal citations
omitted).
40 See infra text accompanying note 117 for traditional examples of relationships that
qualify for special duties.
41 See Warren, 444 A.2d at 9.
42 See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 193 (1989)
(bringing claim against social workers for failure to protect from child abuse); Jackson v.
Joilet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1201 (7th Cir. 1983) (bringing claim against officer for failure to save
occupants of burning automobile); Sanders v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1094,
1103–04 (D. Colo. 2001) (bringing claim against police at Columbine for failing to rescue
David Sanders).
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lows for recovery of attorneys’ fees.43  However, in DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services, the Supreme Court
held that, similar to the common law public duty doctrine, there is no
constitutional duty to provide essential services unless the Due Process
Clause imposes a special duty on the state to assume responsibility for an
individual’s safety.44  In addition, the burden for proving that a state has
a special duty seems to be higher for § 1983 claims, requiring a plaintiff
to show that the state affirmatively acted to restrain the plaintiff’s ability
to act “through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar re-
straint of personal liberty.”45
In DeShaney, the Court held that no such special duty existed even
though social service employees, acting as state agents, knew that the
four-year-old victim faced a special danger of abuse by his father, visited
the victim monthly, proclaimed that they would protect the victim, and
yet allowed the victim to remain in his father’s custody, resulting in brain
damage so severe that the victim was expected to spend the rest of his
life confined to a mental institution.46
It would seem easier for this plaintiff to recover on a claim for com-
mon law negligence because these facts would likely satisfy the special
relationship exception to the public duty doctrine.  There was almost cer-
tainly a direct contact on behalf of the government because agents regu-
larly made special visits to the victim and made specific attempts to
protect him, such as making recommendations that he enroll in preschool
and that his father attend counseling.47  Although justifiable reliance may
be harder to prove, the fact that the state took the victim into custody in
the past and the fact that the victim was too young to defend himself may
have shown reliance on the state.48  Indeed, the Court admitted that the
state may have “acquired a duty under state tort law to provide [the vic-
tim] with adequate protection.”49  Therefore, a common law negligence
claim alleging a special relationship exception to the public duty doctrine
may more likely support recovery in such cases.
Indeed, in addition to a higher burden for proving a special relation-
ship, the Supreme Court has held that plaintiffs making § 1983 claims
alleging violations of substantive due process must prove that a defen-
dant’s conduct was not merely negligent but “shocks the conscience.”50
And the “sort of official action most likely to rise to the conscience-
43 See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2012).
44 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199–200.
45 See id. at 200.
46 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 192–93, 197–98.
47 See id. at 192.
48 See id.
49 Id. at 201–02.
50 Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998).
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shocking level” is “conduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable
by any government interest.”51
The Court has not laid down a specific test to determine what
shocks the conscience because “substantive due process demands an ex-
act analysis of circumstances before any abuse of power is condemned as
conscience-shocking.”52  In some cases, such as those involving Eighth
Amendment claims of cruel and unusual punishment, it may “suffice
for . . . liability that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the
medical needs of their prisoners.”53  However, “[d]eliberate indifference
that shocks in one environment may not be so patently egregious in an-
other,” and thus injuries following from actions that fall between negli-
gence and intentional conduct are closer calls.54
But it remains clear that liability requires more than negligence, and
this is therefore a higher standard than would be required in common law
tort claims.  Although the Supreme Court has been reluctant to treat the
Fourteenth Amendment as a “font of tort law,” states may still “provide
victims with personally enforceable remedies,”55 and therefore state
courts and legislatures should act to ensure that victims in such tragic
cases are not barred from recovery.
C. Interaction with Qualified and Sovereign Immunity Doctrines
The public duty doctrine is a defense separate from qualified and
sovereign immunity. However, in order to understand how a plaintiff can
prevail in a suit against a state or municipal government or its agents, it
is necessary to understand how immunity doctrines operate. If the de-
fendants in failure to protect cases were immune from suit anyway, then
the public duty doctrine would be a superfluous defense.
1. Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity is a defense that individual officials can raise
when they are sued in their personal capacities.56  There are state and
federal variants. In states that recognize a “qualified immunity” defense,
the standard is generally that officials performing discretionary acts will
be immune from liability as long as the official’s conduct “is not willful,
51 Id. at 849.
52 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 850.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 849–50.
55 Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005).
56 See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 639 (1980) (recognizing qualified immunity for
public officers from damages liability under § 1983).
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malicious or intended to cause harm.”57  Generally, discretionary acts
require personal deliberation and judgment, while ministerial acts merely
require the execution of a specific duty.58  For immunity purposes, courts
typically hold that traditional police activities are discretionary.59  Addi-
tionally, the conduct standard clearly excludes negligence as a basis for
liability.  Therefore, in these states, claims against police officers in their
individual capacities for negligent failures to protect would likely fail.
However, other states, such as California, hold that “qualified im-
munity” is a doctrine of federal common law that applies only in § 1983
claims and not in state law claims.60  In the § 1983 cases where it ap-
plies, qualified immunity bars liability as long as an official’s conduct
“does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.”61  Because DeShaney
held that officials have no constitutional duty to protect individuals from
private violence,62 qualified immunity likely bars personal liability in
negligent failure to protect claims.63  Therefore, plaintiffs alleging a fail-
ure to protect—and successfully circumventing the public duty bar—
seem more likely to ultimately recover against individual officers on
state tort law claims as long as the state does not recognize a qualified
immunity defense.
2. Sovereign Immunity
Sovereign immunity is a common law doctrine that makes states
immune to lawsuits.64  In many states, municipalities enjoy the same
sovereign immunity as the state when tortious conduct arises from gov-
57 See Trimble v. City of Denver, 697 P.2d 716, 729 (Colo. 1985) (recognizing that “a
majority of states have adopted a general rule holding that an official performing discretionary
acts within the scope of his office enjoys only qualified immunity”).
58 E.g., Miree v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 768, 774–75 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (holding that
airport manager’s failure to disperse or kill birds at airport was ministerial action because
decision to correct bird problem had already been made, the time for exercising personal judg-
ment had passed, and he was not free to disregard this decision).
59 1 ISIDORE SILVER, POLICE CIVIL LIABILITY § 8.10[2] (Matthew Bender rev. ed., 2015).
60 See Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1072 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing and applying
California law to reverse dismissal of state claims because qualified immunity did not apply to
state law claims and no state statutory immunities existed to shield defendants).
61 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
62 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196–97 (1989).
63 Compare Ross v. United States, 910 F.2d 1422, 1433 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that
recklessness is sufficient mental state for constitutional violation and that jury could find reck-
lessness where plaintiff alleged that deputy ordered civilians to cease efforts to rescue boy
drowning in lake), with Jackson v. Joilet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1202, 1204–05 (7th Cir. 1983) (hold-
ing that negligence does not support cause of action under § 1983 and that officer’s failure to
rescue victims from car crash was at worst grossly negligent and not actionable).
64 26 LOUIS R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PERSONAL INJURY: ACTIONS, DEFENSES,
DAMAGES § 131.01[1] (Matthew Bender rev. ed., 2014).
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ernmental, as opposed to proprietary, functions.65  A state has immunity
for the torts of its agencies and employees; these agencies and employees
also have immunity against tort claims if sued in their official capaci-
ties.66  Because a state is liable for the torts of its agents and employees,
plaintiffs can succeed on such claims if a state constitutional provision
exists, there is statutory consent to suit, or the state judiciary has abro-
gated or limited the state’s common law immunity.67  In many states,
common law sovereign immunity has been abrogated or limited by judi-
cial decision.68  However, the result has often been that state legislatures
reenact the doctrine by statute but allow for certain exceptions for spe-
cific types of suit.69
Therefore, whether or not a plaintiff can seek relief from a state will
depend on the specific state’s torts claim act.70  These range from stat-
utes making the state liable from all tortious conduct to the same extent a
private person would, such as Washington’s,71 to ones with few, limited
exceptions—usually for motor vehicle incidents—such as Missouri’s.72
The viability of failure to protect claims will likely depend on whether or
not a state’s torts claims act allows for suits for injuries resulting from
officers’ omissions.
In those states that have waived immunity, the only thing standing
between a plaintiff and recovery for negligent failures to protect is the
public duty doctrine.  While Part II of this Note will argue that courts in
all states should recognize a special relationship exception to the public
duty doctrine regardless of immunity, Part III will argue that legislatures
in states that have not waived sovereign immunity from such suits should
both impose an affirmative duty for officers to act and waive immunity
from liability in such suits.
65 See, e.g., Vikings Utilities Corp. v. Onslow Water & Sewer Auth., 755 S.E.2d 62, 64
(N.C. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that North Carolina municipality is “immune from suit for the
negligence of its employees in the exercise of governmental functions absent waiver of immu-
nity”) (quoting Evans ex rel. Horton v. Housing Auth., S.E.2d 668, 670 (N.C. 2004)) (internal
quotation marks omitted); Phelps v. City of Kansas, 371 S.W.3d 909, 912 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012)
(citing Missouri statute retaining sovereign immunity for municipalities in all but four situa-
tions); Brooks ex rel. Wright v. Housing Auth. of Baltimore City, 984 A.2d 836, 848 (Md.
2009) (holding that Maryland General Assembly waived housing authority’s immunity).
66 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 64, § 131.01[2]. R
67 See id.
68 Id. § 131.02[1].
69 Id.
70 See Cole, supra note 16 (explaining that some states’ tort claims acts retain sovereign R
immunity with specific exceptions that allow suits while others presume that immunity is
waived with exceptions that prevent waiver); FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 64, R
§ 131.02[1], tbl.131-1 (listing relevant statutes of all 50 states).
71 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.92.090 (LexisNexis 2014).
72 MO. REV. STAT. § 537.600 (2013).
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II. WHY COURTS SHOULD PRESUME A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP TO
PROTECT AGAINST VIOLENT CRIMINAL ACTS
IN GUN-FREE ZONES
In most cases, this combination of the public duty doctrine and im-
munity is beneficial. It helps ensure that public officials are not automati-
cally tagged with liability, which may deter them “from lawful conduct
that advances the public good.”73  However, the doctrine becomes inflex-
ible and suspect when the government obtains a monopoly on protecting
the public in a clearly defined area. When the government creates such
an area through its policies, courts should recognize that a special rela-
tionship exists in which the government owes a duty to replace the self-
protection that it has denied private citizens.
A. Cases in the Aftermath of Columbine
After the tragic events at Columbine, families of the victims looked
to bring suit against anyone who could possibly be held liable.  Families
sued the parents of the shooters,74 the individuals who sold guns to the
shooters,75 law enforcement officers,76 school officials,77 and even vio-
lent video game manufacturers by alleging that their products had influ-
enced the shooters and thereby caused the shootings.78  The district court
dismissed the claims against the school officials79 and video game manu-
facturers,80 and the plaintiffs reached a settlement agreement with both
the parents of the shooters and the friends who helped the shooters obtain
the guns.81  The settlement was for $2.53 million and was split between
approximately thirty-six families.82  The families of six other victims
reached a settlement with the gun sellers.83  As for law enforcement, the
court in Schnurr v. Board of County Commissioners dismissed the stu-
73 Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229, 236 (2006).
74 See Shoels v. Klebold, 375 F.3d 1054, 1060 (10th Cir. 2004) (recounting the details
behind the settlement between the families and the parents of the shooters).
75 Ireland v. Jefferson Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 193 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1214–15 (D. Colo.
2002).
76 Id. at 1211; Sanders v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1103–04 (D.
Colo. 2001); Schnurr v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1118 (D. Colo. 2001).
77 Castaldo v. Stone, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1136 (D. Colo. 2001).
78 See Sanders v. Acclaim Entm’t, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1268–69 (D. Colo. 2002).
79 Castaldo, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 1175.
80 Acclaim Entm’t, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d at 1281–82.
81 Columbine: Families Agree to Settle Suit with Gun Supplier, CJONLINE.COM (May 8,
2001), http://cjonline.com/stories/050801/new_columbine.shtml.
82 See id. (“about three dozen families”); Jay Stapleton, Post-Shooting Lawsuits Are
Hard to Win, CONN. LAW TRIBUNE (Dec. 21, 2012), http://www.ctlawtribune.com/id=1202582
406025/PostShooting-Lawsuits-Are-Hard-To-Win (“$2.53 million”).
83 Columbine Families Settle Lawsuits over Sales of Killers’ Guns, CHICAGO TRIBUNE,
Feb. 2, 2003, at 12.
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dents’ claims against the officers,84 but the same court in Sanders v.
Board of County Commissioners allowed the claim of the daughter of
Mr. Sanders to proceed against the officers.85  This section will compare
Sanders with Schnurr and summarize the roles that the public duty and
immunity doctrines played in each.
In Sanders, the plaintiff sued under § 1983 instead of under state
tort law.86  Even though § 1983 claims have higher standards, the court
held that a special relationship existed and denied defendants’ motions to
dismiss on all claims.87  The court held that the defendants entered a
special relationship with Mr. Sanders because the actions of the defend-
ants amounted to “restraint” as contemplated by DeShaney.88  The court
noted that the commanders directed the dispatchers to continue to assure
the callers in the room with Mr. Sanders that help was “on the way” and
to order all of the occupants not to leave the room to seek aid or rescue
because it would draw the attention of the attackers.89
The court placed special focus on the fact that the defendants knew
that this information was false because the defendants had prohibited res-
cue personnel from entering the school and knew that the shooters had
already committed suicide.90  Because the court found that the defend-
ants “created a prolonged involuntary confinement” and “acted affirma-
tively to restrain the freedom of the occupants,” it held that the
defendants entered into a special relationship “giving rise to a constitu-
tional duty to protect and provide care.”91  Furthermore, the court denied
qualified immunity to the defendants because the court held that the spe-
cial relationship doctrine was sufficiently established at the time so that
reasonable officers “would have understood that their actions violated
Mr. Sanders’ constitutional right to substantive due process.”92
After the court denied the motions to dismiss and allowed the case
to move forward, the plaintiff eventually obtained a settlement for $1.5
million—a relatively large amount, considering that approximately
thirty-six families had to split the $2.53 million settlement obtained from
84 Schnurr v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1144 (D. Colo. 2001).
85 192 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (D. Colo. 2001).
86 Id. at 1103–04.
87 Id. at 1117, 1124.  The court also held that DeShaney’s second exception to the gen-
eral rule against a constitutional duty to protect—the state-created danger doctrine—was satis-
fied. See id. at 1109, 1117.
88 Id. at 1117.
89 Id.
90 See id. at 1117–18 (“[The court] may consider allegations of false promises of aid in
support of Claim Two.”) (emphasis in original).
91 Id. at 1118–19.
92 Id. at 1124.
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the parents and friends of the shooters.93  This difference was likely be-
cause the plaintiff had already won on the motion to dismiss and gained
additional leverage.  Therefore, finding a special relationship can poten-
tially have a very large effect on victim compensation.
In Schnurr, the students sued officers on both § 1983 grounds and
state tort law grounds.94  The court dismissed the § 1983 claims, finding
no special relationship under DeShaney because the defendants’ “re-
straint” of the students in the library was not similar to incarceration, and
because the decisions to not enter the building and to tell students to
remain in the library was not “conscience shocking in a constitutional
sense.”95  Furthermore, even if the defendants had violated the rights of
the plaintiffs, the court held that qualified immunity would protect them
because the contours of the special relationship exception were not clear
and would not have provided “notice to reasonable officers” that their
actions created a relationship.96
Under state tort law, however, the court concluded that a special
relationship did exist.97  To establish a special relationship under Colo-
rado law, the plaintiffs needed only to prove that “officers’ actions cre-
ated reasonable reliance on the part of the victims that the police would
assist or protect them.”98  The court found that the defendants “induced
the reliance” of the victims by telling them to remain in the library and
that help was on the way.99
However, even though the court found a special relationship, the
court still dismissed the state law claims for two reasons.  First, the court
held that the plaintiffs’ claim was barred by the Colorado Governmental
Immunity Act (CGIA).100  Although the court noted that the actions of
the defendants may have constituted negligence, or even gross negli-
gence,101 the CGIA bars claims against public employees unless their
conduct was “willful and wanton.”102  Therefore, unlike the failed quali-
fied immunity defense in Sanders, the officers here were protected by the
state’s decision to grant them immunity from their own negligence.
Second, the court applied Colorado law and examined an additional
four factors to determine whether a duty existed.103  This practice con-
93 Columbine High School Shootings Fast Facts, CNN (Apr. 18, 2014), http://edition.cnn
.com/2013/09/18/us/columbine-high-school-shootings-fast-facts/index.html.
94 Schnurr v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1118 (D. Colo. 2001).
95 Id. at 1133–34.
96 Id. at 1137.
97 Id. at 1141.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 1140.
101 Id.
102 COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-118(2)(a) (2014).
103 Schnurr, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 1142.
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trasts with that of approximately twenty-five states that find a duty when-
ever a special relationship exists.104  Although the court found that the
foreseeability of the harm and the small burden in guarding against it
weighed in favor of imposing a duty on the defendants, the court decided
not to impose a duty because it determined that the high social utility of
providing emergency services would be diminished.105  Therefore, be-
cause of these two idiosyncrasies of state law, the families of the stu-
dents—unlike the daughter of Mr. Sanders—were unable to ultimately
recover against the law enforcement officers responsible for protecting
the community.
B. Courts Should Presume that a Duty to Protect Civilians Exists
Within Gun-Free Zones
The concept that disarmament should create a duty to protect those
who are disarmed is not a new one. In 1968, Judge Keating, dissenting in
Riss v. New York, argued that liability should be imposed for the negli-
gent failure to provide police protection.106  He pointed out that the city’s
position denying liability was difficult to understand given that the vic-
tim, in compliance with the law, “did not carry any weapon for self-
defense” and was thereby “required to rely for protection on the City of
New York,” which then “denie[d] all responsibility to her.”107  Lance
Stell, reacting to cases such as Warren, has argued that, “[w]hen the state
disables civilians’ carrying handguns for personal defense but refuses to
acknowledge incurring a special duty of care to protect those it disables,
it demotes them from full citizenship, commits a serious injustice and
diminishes the state’s legitimacy.”108
However, Stell was writing in 2006 before the Supreme Court de-
cided District of Columbia v. Heller in 2008.109  In Heller, the Court
declared that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to pos-
sess firearms—at least within one’s home.110  However, the Court quali-
fied this right by noting that its opinion should not “cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms . . . forbidding
104 See Eaton, supra note 36, at 4 (listing cases for twenty-five states recognizing an R
exception “where there has been created a special relationship between a municipality and an
individual, and thus a special duty of protection”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
105 See Schnurr, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 1142–43 (weighing the four factors of foreseeability,
social utility of defendant’s conduct, magnitude of burden, and practical consequences of im-
posing duty).
106 240 N.E.2d 860, 867 (Keating, J., dissenting).
107 Id. at 862 (Keating, J., dissenting).
108 Lance K. Stell, Self-Defense and Handgun Rights, 2 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 265, 265,
277 (2006).
109 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
110 Id. at 635.  The Supreme Court later confirmed that this right applies to both the
federal government and the states.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 749 (2010).
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the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and govern-
ment buildings.”111  Because civilians can no longer be disarmed by law
within their homes, the Court’s decision seems to have weakened a dis-
armament argument for finding a special duty to protect civilians—at
least in cases such as Warren which take place inside the home.112  But,
following this logic, it would also appear that a disarmament argument
could still apply to protect civilians affected by the remaining legal gun
bans: those within schools and government buildings.113
Therefore, this section will first argue that gun-free zones create
conditions that should automatically satisfy the most common elements
of the common law special relationship test. It will then argue that, even
in jurisdictions that require more than a special relationship to create a
duty, other common factors also suggest that courts should find a special
duty to protect civilians in gun-free zones.
1. Special Relationship Test
Different states use different tests to determine the existence of a
special relationship.  The court in Schnurr applied Colorado law and de-
termined that it needed to find only one of two alternative elements:
“custody or control” or “reasonable reliance.”114  In Allen v. District of
Columbia, the most recent case in the Warren line of cases in D.C., the
court required the plaintiff to prove both “a direct or continuing contact”
(analogous to Schnurr’s “custody or control”) and “a justifiable reliance”
(analogous to Schnurr’s “reasonable reliance”).115  In any case, when a
criminal initiates a shooting in a gun-free school zone, both of these ele-
ments should be automatically satisfied.
111 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
112 This has not stopped gun-rights activists from citing Warren to support arguments to
expand gun rights further.  They argue that because police have no duty to protect, citizens
should be armed. See Brief of Pink Pistols as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appel-
lants-Cross-Appellees, Nojay v. Cuomo, 2014 U.S. 2nd Cir. Briefs LEXIS 445, 15 (May 6,
2014) (No. 14-0036-cv(L)) (arguing that New York’s ban of large capacity magazines and
assault weapons is unconstitutional, and citing Warren as evidence that “no citizen enjoys a
constitutional right to police protection,” and thus it is no answer to say that “because the
police are well-armed, citizens need not be”).  This Note’s argument is related: as long as
citizens are disarmed, there should be a duty.
113 This logic would not necessarily extend to create a duty owed to classes of citizens
falling with Heller’s longstanding prohibition exception: “felons and the mentally ill.” Id.
That is because person-specific gun restrictions would not give officers adequate notice of who
is reliant on them and because disarmed individuals would not be reliant exclusively on the
government—they could rely on other armed private citizens to protect them.
114 Schnurr v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1140–41 (D. Colo. 2001).
115 100 A.3d 63, 78 (D.C. 2014).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\25-2\CJP205.txt unknown Seq: 16 20-APR-16 12:16
514 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 25:499
a. Justifiable Reliance
To the extent that certain states require victims to take action in
reliance,116 their tests do not advance the policies that a special relation-
ship test should serve.  Traditional examples of special relationships are
parent and child, teacher and student, and jailer and prisoner.117  None of
these examples require the controlling party to affirmatively act to induce
reliance; the determinative element according to the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts is simply that the party “is required by law to take or who
voluntarily takes the custody of another under circumstances such as to
deprive him of his normal power of self-protection.”118
Therefore, although direct contact should be still required to estab-
lish custody, the proper test should not require affirmative action to es-
tablish reliance; the fact that the victim has been rendered reliant on state
actors should be sufficient.  Indeed, in Archie v. City of Racine, the Sev-
enth Circuit stated the similar proposition that “[w]hen a state cuts off
sources of private aid, it must provide replacement protection.”119
Therefore, if the state fails to provide adequate replacement protection, it
makes sense to hold the state liable specifically because of the victim’s
reliance on the state in general.
By prohibiting guns within an entire area, the state renders civilians
reliant on the state for protection in all shooter situations because fire-
arms are the only means reasonably capable of defending against other
firearms.  Although plaintiffs at home like in Warren can no longer claim
that the state rendered them defenseless, victims at schools can make this
claim.  In public schools, any guards stationed there will be police of-
ficers or state contractors, so the only agents capable of protecting stu-
dents will be agents of the state.  In private schools, the reliance
argument would still apply if no private armed guards are allowed.120
Then state emergency responders would be the only means of protection
in lethal violence cases.
116 See, e.g., id. at 73–74 (requiring plaintiff to show that he acted in a different way
because of the presence of emergency medical technicians).
117 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314B(1) (AM. LAW. INST. 1965) (“master is
subject to liability”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 320 cmt. a (AM. LAW. INST. 1965)
(applicable to “jailer” and “teacher”).
118 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 320 (AM. LAW. INST. 1965).
119 Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1223 (7th Cir. 1988).
120 For an example of an ordinance banning all guns on school property, see WOODBURY,
MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 13-5(g) (2014) (making no exception for private security
guards).  If a state does allow private schools to hire armed guards, as Virginia does, then
courts do not need to automatically find a special relationship in those schools because they
are not completely reliant on the state for protection. See VA. CODE. ANN. § 18.2-308.1(C)
(2015) (making exception to gun-free law for an “armed security officer . . . hired by a private
or religious school”).
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Although officers may not “voluntarily” render students reliant on
them, the Restatement imposes a duty on them whenever they are “re-
quired by law” to take custody under circumstances depriving them of
their ability to protect themselves.  The students in gun-free zones are
deprived of their ability to defend themselves, and the officers are re-
quired by law to respond to the emergency.  Therefore, because students
rely on law enforcement officers for protection in all situations involving
lethal criminal violence, courts should presume that victims are “reliant”
on the officers who respond to aid them.
b. Direct and Continuing Contact
Although this analysis applies to special relationships in common
law—and not constitutional—claims, the Supreme Court’s description of
state power in public schools proves helpful in guiding this analysis.  In
Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, the Court noted that a state’s
power over public school children “is custodial and tutelary, permitting a
degree of supervision and control that could not be exercised over free
adults.”121  Even though the issue in Vernonia was whether a school drug
testing policy violated students’ Fourth Amendment rights—and not
whether the state had a constitutional duty to protect students—the Court
was careful to point out that it did not “suggest that public schools as a
general matter have such a degree of control over children as to give rise
to a constitutional duty to protect.”122
Admittedly, the degree of control within schools may not be suffi-
cient to establish a constitutional duty under the DeShaney test requiring
“incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal
liberty.”123  Nevertheless, it should be sufficient to meet a common law
standard of direct and continuing contact with the government—espe-
cially if courts consider the following combination of factors: compul-
sory education laws that force students to attend school, gun bans that
disarm the adults who can protect them, and the affirmative actions of
officers who undertake to protect them in an emergency.
In § 1983 claims, courts have typically held that compulsory educa-
tion laws alone are not sufficient to establish a special relationship.  For
example, in D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School, the
Third Circuit held that a school’s physical authority over students did not
“create the type of physical custody necessary to bring it within the spe-
cial relationship noted in DeShaney.”124  The court distinguished school-
121 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995).
122 Id. at 648, 655 (internal quotation marks omitted).
123 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989).
124 D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Tech. Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1372 (3d Cir.
1992).
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ing from custody by focusing on the fact that the “state did nothing to
restrict [the victim’s] liberty after school hours and thus did not deny her
meaningful access to sources of help.”125  The D.R. case involved male
students who molested a female victim “on a regular basis” for four
months.126  The court noted that during this time, the victim could have
sought help from “persons unrelated to the state”127 and her parents
could have legally withdrawn the victim for safety reasons.128
However, during an emergency situation like Columbine, neither
students nor teachers have access to outside help from non-state actors.
Once inside a classroom, it may be impossible to safely escape.  And,
while a passing armed civilian may wish to enter the school and inter-
vene, the relevant state law would likely prevent the civilian from doing
so legally.129  Therefore, the justifications given for denying a duty to
protect students from criminal acts in the D.R. context do not necessarily
extend to situations where disarmament is relevant to defending against
the criminal action or to state law standards for finding a duty to protect.
Indeed, in state tort law contexts specifically, at least one court has
recognized a special relationship between schools and students, “result-
ing in the imposition of an affirmative duty to take all reasonable steps to
protect its students.”130  The California state court in M.W. v. Panama
Buena Vista Union School District recognized that this duty “arises, in
part, based on the compulsory nature of education” and held the school
district liable for failing to prevent sexual assault among students.131  It is
sensible to conclude that, at least in public schools, compulsory educa-
tion laws alone should always create direct and continuing contact with
students, if not reliance.
But the argument for recognizing a direct contact becomes even
stronger when the state’s compulsory education laws are combined with
gun bans around the private school and state agents respond to the emer-
gency and undertake specific efforts to rescue the victims.  Although stu-
dents are not forced to attend a state-run school, they are similarly
compelled into a custodial relationship with adults who the state has dis-
armed.  The direct contact is not between a school district and the stu-
125 Id.
126 Id. at 1366.
127 Id. at 1372.
128 See id. at 1371 (“[A] parent is justified in withdrawing his child from a school where
the health and welfare of the child is threatened.”) (quoting Zebra v. Sch. Dist. of City of
Pittsburgh, 296 A.2d 748, 751 (Pa. 1972)).
129 See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.1 (2015) (prohibiting possession of firearms on school
property and listing exceptions, but providing no exception for private civilians in emergency
response).
130 M.W. v. Panama Buena Vista Union Sch. Dist., 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 673, 679 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2003).
131 Id.
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dent, but should run between the state and the student.  Of course, the
state cannot be sued in tort for negligently enacting a law.132  However,
the state can be liable as employer, in accordance with its state tort
claims act, when its employees commit negligence.133
Therefore, once officers initiate a rescue, the contact with the state
itself should be complete.  In accordance with tort principles, if the of-
ficers were private actors, once they undertake to render services, they
must exercise reasonable care.134  Once their actions are directed towards
protecting civilians within the area, a direct contact should form.  Al-
though the public duty doctrine exists to protect officers from incurring
liability in such situations where their job requires them to initiate res-
cues, the requirement of reliance should accomplish that goal.  As stated
previously, situations in gun-free zones differ from other police re-
sponses because disarmament creates reliance on the state for protection.
Therefore, the response directed at students who the state has already put
into this dangerous situation should establish direct contact with at least
the state, if not the officers themselves.
c. Extending Special Relationship to Officers
Having established that students have, through legislation, school
policy, and actions of officers, had direct contact with and reliance on the
state, the state should be amenable to suit for the negligence of its agents.
The only remaining question is whether the officers themselves can be
sued individually.  In other words, can the actions of the state’s agents
combine with the state’s actions in creating a dangerous environment
through compulsory education and gun bans to establish a link between
the student and officer?  In cases like Schnurr, courts considered whether
the individual officers had contact or created reliance, but did not con-
sider whether laws that created contact or reliance extended to of-
ficers.135  The officers themselves did not have continuous contact with
the students like the state had through the school, and the officers did not
create the conditions that rendered the students reliant.  However, it is
not unprecedented for courts to acknowledge that agents can be negligent
132 Again, this is because the states have sovereign immunity against suits unless waived
in a state torts claim act, which would not include negligently passing a law exposing civilians
to danger. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8, 215 (2014) (holding state liable in same manner
and same extent private individual would be, but private individuals have no legislative
authority).
133 See id. § 81-8, 209 (allowing the state to be liable for torts committed by its “officers,
agents, or employees” to the extent provided by Nebraska’s state tort claims act).
134 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
135 See Schnurr v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1141 (D. Colo. 2001)
(concluding that the sheriff defendants’ actions induced reliance and concluding without anal-
ysis that they lacked custody or control).
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for failing to warn others of dangerous conditions created by their
principals.136
Therefore, when officers make affirmative efforts to aid civilians
already reliant on them for help, like the victims in Schnurr and Sanders,
they should be liable for any negligence they commit.  To hold otherwise
would allow states to eliminate liability by having the school create the
contact, the legislature create the reliance, and the officer commit the
negligence.  Victims should not have to meet such an onerous burden to
establish that officers upon whom they rely during emergencies have a
duty to protect them from harm.
2. Other Factors
To the extent that the court in Schnurr considered extra factors at
all, this practice should not be standard among courts determining
whether state agents have a duty to protect.  The court in Schnurr
adopted its factors from Solano v. Goff,137 which in turn cites Davenport
v. Community Corrections138 as the source of the factors.139  Yet the
court in Davenport was considering imposing a new, common-law duty
on a private corporation operating a corrections facility—not a state
agent whose job is to protect civilians.140  Indeed, in a comment note, the
American Law Reports even describes these factors as influencing the
duty of a “private person for failure to protect.”141  However, the one
factor that may be appropriate to consider when determining the duty of
a state agent, foreseeability, still points towards liability.  The factor of
social utility is more appropriate to leave to the legislature, especially
since officers also have an immunity defense and the legislature is capa-
ble of revoking that immunity if it so decides.  And the factors of the
magnitude of the burden and the practical consequences of imposing a
duty should instead be analyzed when considering what sort of behavior
constitutes a breach of the duty.
136 See Demoranville v. Rose, No. CV-10-178, 2012 Me. Super. LEXIS 64, at *9–11
(Super. Ct. Me. Apr. 27, 2012) (acknowledging that agent could have committed tort by failing
to warn victim of hole in principal’s porch).
137 Solano v. Goff, 985 P.2d 53, 54 (Colo. App. 1999).
138 Davenport v. Cmty. Corrs., 962 P.2d 963, 967–68 (Colo. 1998).
139 Schnurr, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 1142.
140 Davenport, 962 P.2d at 965.
141 See E.L. Kellet, Annotation, Private Person’s Duty and Liability for Failure to Protect
Another Against Criminal Attack by Third Person, 10 A.L.R.3d 619, [1], [2] (2014) (listing
“foreseeability,” “inability to comply,” “economics,” and “social utility”).
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a. Foreseeability
Foreseeability is based on “common sense perceptions of the
risks.”142  As the defendants in Schnurr admitted, “there was a foresee-
able risk of harm” to the victims.143 Indeed, it is difficult to see how
harm to disarmed civilians during a school shooting would not be fore-
seeable.  If officers do not act, then civilians will continue to be harmed.
Defendants could try to argue that they should not have a duty to protect
individuals who they do not know exist, unlike the victim in Sanders
about whose condition the officers knew.144  However, at least one court
has found that argument unavailing specifically in a school context.  In
District of Columbia v. Doe, the D.C. Court of Appeals held that a school
could be found liable for the rape of a student because the harm to stu-
dents in general from intruders was foreseeable.145  This view makes
sense because defendants should not need to know which individual is
harmed as long as they know that someone will be harmed.  Therefore,
the fact that officers could owe a duty to multiple unknown students
should not diminish the effect of foreseeability on the imposition of a
duty.
b. Social Utility of Defendants’ Conduct
The court in Schnurr placed a very high value on the social utility of
the officers’ “function and purpose.”146  Indeed, even though the court
acknowledged that the foreseeability of the harm and the small burden in
providing accurate information to the students weighed in favor of im-
posing a duty, the court decided against finding a duty for fear of creat-
ing a “disincentive to provide emergency law enforcement services.”147
The court did not explain how the “spectre of personal liability”148 would
cause public officials to cease providing a necessary public service or act
differently when responding to an emergency situation where lives are at
risk.  While this line of reasoning may be appropriate in the private sec-
tor where entrepreneurs may decide against doing business, the court
does not account for several factors that distinguish state actors.
142 Taco Bell, Inc. v. Lannon, 744 P.2d 43, 48 (Colo. 1987).
143 Schnurr, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 1142.
144 See Sanders v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1103 (D. Colo. 2001)
(referring to Mr. Sanders as “the only individual known to the Command Defendants to be in
urgent need of emergency life-saving medical treatment”).
145 See District of Columbia v. Doe, 524 A.2d 30, 33–34 (D.C. 1987) (“[O]fficials were
on notice of the danger to students of assaultive criminal conduct by intruders.”).
146 Schnurr, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 1142.
147 Id. at 1142–43.
148 Id. at 1143.
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First, the legislature may grant immunity, as Colorado in fact did
through the CGIA.149  So the social utility of officers’ conduct was a
factor that the legislature had already considered and acted upon.  Re-
gardless of whether the court found a special relationship, the plaintiffs
in Schnurr would have failed without new legislative action.  Yet by con-
tinuing its analysis and recognizing social utility as a separate reason to
reject finding a duty, the court created precedent that would bind it even
if the legislature reconsiders the social utility of officers’ actions and
repeals immunity in the future.  To the extent that legislatures are per-
fectly capable of weighing social utility when deciding whether to grant
immunity, courts should not engage in the counterproductive exercise of
acting as a second line of policymakers.
Second, according to a recent study by Joanna Schwartz, police of-
ficers are almost always indemnified and rarely have to worry about pay-
ing the cost in a civil suit.150  In fact, “[b]etween 2006 and 2011, in forty-
four of the country’s largest jurisdictions, officers financially contributed
to settlements and judgments in just .41%  of the approximately 9225
civil rights damages actions resolved in plaintiffs’ favor.”151  Although
the study focused mostly on § 1983 claims and did not include negli-
gence cases, it did include other state tort claims such as assault, and the
“data suggests that the findings would be the same for all types of cases
in which law enforcement officers are named as defendants.”152  There-
fore, the “spectre of personal liability” would not affect officers’ actions
as much as it would the government’s budget.
Third, even though governments routinely indemnify these officers,
Schwartz suggests that governments still do not bother to “take decisive
enough action to curb misconduct or manage their officers,” nor do they
even consider “whether or how to reduce the police activities that prompt
these suits.”153  So it appears that most police officers and departments
actually do not change their behavior based on lawsuits against them.
Thus, even if courts do consider social utility independent of the legisla-
ture, they should conclude—as should the legislature—that it does not
weigh against finding a duty.
Lastly, if the social utility of police protection is high enough to
overcome such foreseeable harm and small burdens as in Schnurr, liabil-
149 COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-118(2)(a) (2014).
150 Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 890 (2014) (re-
porting that “[p]olice officers are virtually always indemnified” and providing statistics); see
also Nancy Leong, Police Don’t Pay, JOTWELL (Nov. 7, 2013), http://courtslaw.jotwell.com/
police-dont-pay/ (interviewing officer who claimed that he “didn’t worry about section 1983
because an occasional lawsuit was par for the course”).
151 Schwartz, supra note 150, at 890. R
152 Id. at 887 n.1.
153 Id. at 891, 956.
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ity would never attach in tort claims no matter how egregious the negli-
gence.  Clearly, social utility should not have such weight in protecting
officers from their having to actually carry out their duty to protect.
c. Magnitude of Burden and Practical Consequences of
Imposing a Duty
In Schnurr, the court held that the burden of complying with a po-
tential duty was not great because it would amount to “provid[ing] accu-
rate information to callers.”154  The court also held that the practical
consequences of complying with a duty would be severe because it
would “render law enforcement officers insurers” for “the conduct of
third parties.”155  Both of these statements seem to rely on assumptions
about what behavior police would exhibit if they knew they had a burden
to protect, and about what behavior police would need to exhibit to avoid
breaching that duty.  Specifically, police would not become “insurers”
unless the court assumed that police would often be found liable for any
harm that occurred to victims to whom they owed a duty.  However, the
mere imposition of a duty does not result in liability.  To avoid liability,
police would only need to act with reasonable care under the circum-
stances.156  Therefore, to determine whether it is “warranted”157 to find a
duty to protect, one should determine how a “reasonable” officer should
be expected to perform in a stressful situation, what it actually takes to
breach the duty, and whether that standard seems just.
Lisa McCabe has already proposed a “professional negligence
model” which should be appropriate for courts to use in shooting scena-
rios and would not unduly burden officers:
The appropriate standard of care is that of a reasonable
and competent officer acting in similar circumstances.
The specific conduct of a reasonable police officer can
be determined by examining police procedures, depart-
mental rules, training manuals, written guidelines, inter-
nal regulations, and other official sources of law
enforcement practices, as well as statutes, ordinances,
and expert testimony.158
154 Schnurr v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1142–43 (D. Colo. 2001).
155 Id. at 1143.
156 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 320 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (imposing “duty
to exercise reasonable care”).
157 Schnurr, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 1143.
158 Lisa McCabe, Comment, Police Officers’ Duty to Rescue or Aid: Are They Only Good
Samaritans?, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 661, 681 (1984).
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McCabe illustrates the standard by showing how the police officers in
Warren could have demonstrated reasonable care by only slightly alter-
ing their conduct:
If, for example, the police hurried to the scene but ar-
rived after the plaintiffs had been abducted, or made re-
peated attempts to locate the plaintiffs and enter the
house but were unsuccessful, their actions would have
sufficiently fulfilled their duty to rescue. The reasonable
police officer standard would, after all, only require rea-
sonable behavior, even if set by professional
guidelines.159
These “professional guidelines,” however, are not determinative. If
they are “unacceptably low,” they can be countered by “judicial impera-
tives.”160  For example, after the Columbine shooting, the LAPD SWAT
team reviewed the actions of the Jefferson County team and “found that
the officers had followed standard procedure.”161  Under this standard, a
jury would likely accept this as sufficient evidence that the officers were
not negligent.  But as Judge Learned Hand pointed out, an industry “may
never set its own tests,” so a jury may still find negligence if the officers
failed to take “precautions so imperative that even their universal disre-
gard will not excuse their omission.”162
However, even if a jury did disregard the standards set by police
procedures and found that it would have been a universal precaution for
reasonable officers to carefully enter the building and slowly make their
way to the library, the jury would also have to determine that doing so
would have prevented the harm to the victims.163  Therefore, this stan-
dard would not impose anything resembling strict liability on officers.
Indeed, the officer response to the shooting at Florida State Univer-
sity embodies this standard.  Officers were first notified of an armed man
outside the library at 12:25 AM.164  They responded immediately and by
12:27 AM officers confronted the shooter and ordered him to put down
his weapon.165  When the shooter ignored these demands and opened fire
159 Id. at 686.
160 Id. at 682–83.
161 RADLEY BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP: THE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICA’S PO-
LICE FORCES 232 (2013).
162 The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
163 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (requiring con-
duct to be the “legal cause” of the plaintiff’s harm to make negligence actionable).
164 Sean Rossman & Karl Etters, Prompt Response, Alert System Stop FSU Shooter My-
ron May, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT (Nov. 22, 2014), http://www.tallahassee.com/story/news/
local/2014/11/22/prompt-response-alert-system-stop-fsu-shooter/19374031/.
165 See id.; Meg Wagner et al., Florida State University Grad Myron May, Who Injured 3
in Shooting at College Library, Was in ‘State of Crisis’: Cops, DAILY NEWS (Nov. 20, 2014),
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on the officers, the officers shot and killed the shooter.166  Although the
shooter did manage to hit three civilians, approximately 500 other poten-
tial victims escaped safely.167  This is exactly how officers should re-
spond when unarmed civilians are in danger and the officers are the only
individuals capable of stopping an armed criminal.  For trained profes-
sionals, this duty is not unreasonably high to comply with.  And, because
the officers acted reasonably, they would not be liable for the three vic-
tims they could not save.
Of course, it is possible that even in a Columbine scenario where
the police fail to confront the shooters as more victims are killed, the
police would be able to prove that their decisions were reasonable. They
could present evidence that they lacked adequate information, had reason
to believe that they would endanger students such as in a hostage situa-
tion, or were following procedures that worked successfully in other
shootings across the country.  However, by refusing to find a duty, courts
prevent the claim from ever reaching this stage and give victims no
chance to recover even if the officers did act unreasonably and fail to
protect them.
III. WHY LEGISLATURES SHOULD IMPOSE A DUTY
AND WAIVE IMMUNITY
Whether or not courts decide to find that police officers take on a
special duty when they respond to school shootings, legislatures should
act to impose one.  Legislatures can do this by imposing a duty on of-
ficers in gun-free zones, similar to how Vermont has imposed on all citi-
zens a duty to provide “reasonable assistance” when another is in
danger.168  They can also waive immunity in state tort claims acts.  For
example, New Mexico’s torts claims act can be reformed to include in its
immunity exemptions a negligent failure to protect from firearm violence
in gun-free zones.169  They should do this for the reasons previously
mentioned in Part II and also for two additional, basic policy reasons:
victim compensation and fairness.
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/alleged-gunman-florida-state-campus-opens-fire-ar-
ticle-1.2017192.
166 Wagner et al., supra note 165. R
167 See Rossman & Etters, supra note 164. R
168 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (2015).
169 See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-12 (LexisNexis 2014) (waiving immunity for liability for
various torts and violations of constitutional rights when committed by officers but not for
negligently failing to protect).
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A. Allowing Negligence Suits Will Promote Victim Compensation
When school shootings occur, victims or their families go on a
search for liability.170  Often, the shooter commits suicide or is killed in a
standoff with police, so families cannot even achieve justice through
conviction.171  Naturally, if the deceased shooters had no assets, the fam-
ilies cannot recover from them.  The state, having disarmed the citizenry,
should bear the cost instead of having it all fall on the victims who have
done nothing wrong.
Indeed, victims rely on the police to capture criminals alive so that
they can see justice done and recover from them.  Although victims have
an incentive to capture the criminal so that they can recover, the police
lack that incentive when they have no liability for any increased damage
that the criminal causes during their delay. For example, in Williams v.
State of California, a piece of a heated brake drum from a passing truck
flew into the victim’s windshield, struck her in the face and caused her to
stop.172  Police arrived but negligently failed to conduct a proper investi-
gation.173  The victim was unable to recover against the truck driver be-
cause the police had let the driver escape.  Therefore, she asserted that
they “destroy[ed] any opportunity on [her] part to recover compensa-
tion.”174  The court found no special relationship because the plaintiff did
not refrain from “conducting an investigation of her own” in reliance on
officers’ promises to do so.175  But of course she did not conduct an
investigation—she had just been struck in the face with a heated brake
drum and her windshield was broken.  And the officers who responded
were the only people she could rely on to catch the person responsible.
Liability would solve this misalignment of interests by incentivizing
action.
Of course, it is possible to over-incentivize action in various ways.
First, individual officers may become inclined to be hastier in acting,
afraid that not acting will expose them to liability.  Of course, if states
continue to indemnify officers, then they likely should not have to worry
actually paying a judgment—the victim will always recover from the
state.176  But the prospect of being hauled into court for a trial or having
to face punishment at work for costing money to the state should provide
170 See supra notes 74–78 and accompanying text.
171 See Columbine High School Shootings Fast Facts, supra note 93 (Columbine shooters R
killed themselves); Wagner et al., supra note 165 (Florida State University shooter killed by R
police).
172 Williams v. State of California, 664 P.2d 137, 138 (Cal. 1983).
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 142.
176 See supra notes 150–52 and accompanying text.
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enough of an incentive to err on the side of acting to protect others than
acting to protect oneself.
Second, imposing liability may affect the behavior of municipalities
and departments. Some may argue that by imposing a duty, legislatures
will encourage municipalities to install metal detectors and other exces-
sive security features in schools to lower the chances of a shooting occur-
ring and avoiding liability for not protecting students. However, schools
have already begun initiating such policies even without such a duty.177
And with a duty, the state will still not be liable as long as it takes rea-
sonable security measures; it does not need to create an enclave of totali-
tarianism within each school. Ultimately, concerns about how much
security should be provided within schools can be solved by local polit-
ics.  Indeed, in New York City, parents and advocates provided signifi-
cant resistance to the idea of the NYPD taking over responsibility for
school security,178 suggesting that this issue would not go unaddressed.
B. Out of Fairness, a Monopoly on Lethal Force Should Require the
Government to Take Responsibility
Finally, fairness dictates that an organization that has a monopoly
should take on extra responsibility for the quality of its services because
consumers have no alternatives.  At common law, companies that ac-
quired monopoly status would acquire a “duty to serve.”179  Because en-
tities with monopoly power take “such affirmative steps through [their]
exclusive control of access to necessary goods and services,” courts
would limit their rights to exclude customers—thus imposing a duty on
them.180  Likewise, as the government becomes the sole source of protec-
tion in an area, citizens become reliant on it, and its duties should expand
to include personal liability.  This is especially true in schools because
truancy laws require children to attend.181  Therefore, to the extent that
government disallows alternatives and takes on the responsibility of pro-
tecting children, it should perform the job reasonably well or be liable if
it fails.  If the government allows private alternatives, as Virginia has by
177 See Udi Ofer, Criminalizing the Classroom: The Rise of Aggressive Policing and Zero
Tolerance Discipline in New York City Public Schools, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1373, 1385
(2012) (discussing Mayor Bloomberg’s program “subjecting all middle and high school stu-
dents to roving metal detector searches”).
178 See id. at 1382 (recounting how “[p]arents, teachers, and community members packed
the hearing room to criticize the proposed transfer”).
179 Note, The Antidiscrimination Principle in the Common Law, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1993, 1995 (1989).
180 Id. at 2010–11.
181 Karl F. Dean, Criminalization of Truancy, 34 NEW ENG. L. REV. 589, 591–92 (1999)
(discussing a trend toward incarceration of students for truancy).
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allowing private armed guards in schools,182 then it would be relieved of
this duty.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, there are currently too many barriers to recovery
under tort law for victims of school shootings when officers negligently
fail to protect them.  Although common sense would suggest that police
have a duty to protect the public, the public duty doctrine protects of-
ficers from liability unless they have taken such affirmative actions as
required under the current test to create a special relationship.  The pub-
lic duty doctrine makes sense to the extent that it prevents imposing an
impossible task on law enforcement to save everyone.  However, its ap-
plication should not be so rigid when civilians are left defenseless.  If
courts account for the reliance created by gun prohibitions within school
zones, they should automatically find a special relationship and thus a
duty to protect the defenseless civilians within these zones.  The social
utility of police protection does not weaken the argument for finding a
duty because police officers are rarely forced to pay, and officers and
governments have not been so adversely affected by other lawsuits that
they have been forced to change their behavior.
Finally, the immunities that some jurisdictions still maintain for of-
ficers who act negligently should be waived for the same reasons that
courts should find that a special duty exists.  By maintaining immunity,
these states would prevent recovery even if a court follows the analysis
proposed in Part II.  Therefore, immunity presents an unnecessary and
unfair obstacle for plaintiffs harmed by police negligence—especially
when plaintiffs are rendered reliant on the police for aid, police officers
take affirmative actions to aid, the harm is foreseeable, officers are in-
demnified by the state, and the magnitude of the burden to act reasonably
is not high. Waiving immunity would promote fairness because of the
government’s monopoly on force and would ensure victim compensa-
tion.  Officers should not be subject to strict liability, but when their neg-
ligence causes harm, the burden should not fall on victims who have
been rendered reliant on the state for protection.
182 See supra note 120.
